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CASE NOTES
Administrative Law—Power of Federal Reserve Board to Deny
Applications Under Bank Holding Company Act—Premium Pay-
ments to Majority Shareholders—Western Bancshares, Inc. v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.'—On December
21, 1970, Jack B. Berkley, President of Stockton National Bank in
Stockton, Kansas, ascertained that Mr. and Mrs. John McCormick
were willing to sell their shares of Rooks County State Bank of
nearby Woodston, Kansas, for $521.51 per share. At that time, the
McCormicks owned seventy-seven percent, or 3831/2 shares, of the
500 outstanding shares of Rooks County State Bank. Jack Berkley
and his family met to discuss the possibility of acquiring this stock,
and at the conclusion of this meeting Jack was authorized to pur-
chase the McCormick shares on behalf of the Berkley family. Jack's
brother, Robert, an attorney, was directed to organize a bank hold-
ing corporation2 in the name of Western Bancshares, Inc., which
was to be the assignee of the purchased stock.
On December 23, 1970, Jack Berkley acquired the McCormick
stock upon payment of $521.51 per share. On the same day, he
notified the remaining shareholders of the Rooks County State Bank
that he and his associates had acquired eighty-three percent of the
bank's stock. Significantly, he did not disclose to them the price per
share he had paid for the McCormick stock. 3 He offered to purchase
each of the outstanding shares at $160.00, and bought 31 shares at
that price during the first week of January 1971. On January 8,
1971, Western Bancshares, Inc. was incorporated under the laws of
480 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1973).
The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 define a bank holding company
as follows:
(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (5) of this subsection, "bank holding
company" means any company which has control over any bank of [sic] over any
company that is or becomes a bank holding company by virtue of this chapter.
(2) Any company has control over a bank or over any company if—
(A) the company directly or indirectly or acting through one or more
other persons owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more
of any class of voting securities of the bank or company;
(B) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of
the directors or trustees of the bank or company; or
(C) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing,
that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling influence over
the management or policies of the bank or company.
(3) For the purposes of any proceeding under paragraph (2)(C) of this subsection,
there is a presumption that any company which directly or indirectly owns, controls,
or has power to vote less than 5 per centum of any class of voting securities of a
given bank or company does not have control over that bank or company.
12 U.S.C. §§ 184I(a)(1)-(3) (1970). By the inclusion of § 1841(a) in the Bank Holding Company
Act Amendments of 1970, the Act was amended to include the one-bank holding company.
' Berkley had also acquired the stock of two other officers of the Rooks County State
Bank at a price of 8400 per share. As in the case of the McCormick stock, he did not disclose
the amount paid for these shares to the minority shareholders. 480 F.2d at 751.
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Kansas, and Jack Berkley assigned the shares of the acquired stock
to the holding company.
The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 4 which
extended the Act's coverage to the one-bank holding company,
became effective December 31, 1970. A one-bank holding company
was defined by the Act to be a company which owned a controlling
interest in a single banks Western Bancshares, Inc. was such a
one-bank holding company, and thus came within the ambit of the
1970 Amendments. Under section 3(a)(1) of the Act, prior approval
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the
Board) was required in any transaction "that causes any company to
become a bank holding company."6
 Pursuant to an order it had
issued on June 22, 1971, 7 the Board considered Western Bancshares'
application for approval of the retention of its controlling block of
the voting shares of Rooks County State Bank. 8 The Board denied
the application and ordered Western Bancshares to divest itself of
all interest in the acquired bank. 9
 Two reasons were given for the
Board's divestiture order: (1) the failure of the holding company to
seek prior Board approval for the acquisition, and (2) the failure of
the holding company to disclose to the minority shareholders of the
acquired bank that their shares had been purchased for a price
substantially lower than that paid for the majority interest." The
Board reasoned that even though approval would have no effect
upon either existing or potential competition," which were the
explicit factors for Board determination set forth in section 3(c) of
the Act, 12
 divestiture would be required because nondisclosure of
12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970).
5 12 U.S.C.	 1841(a)(1) (1970).
6 12 U.S.C.	 1842(a) (1970).
7
 Western Bancshares, Inc., 37 Fed. Reg. 18,243 (1972).
Id. Western Bancshares, Inc. also applied for approval of retention of an insurance
agency. Id.
9
 Id. at 18,244. Four governors ordered divestiture, while two others dissented. Chair-
man Burns was absent and did not vote. Id. at 18,244 n.2.
i° 480 F.2d at 750.
11
 37 Fed. Reg. at 18,243.
12
 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1970) provides:
The Board shall not approve—
(1) any acquisition or merger or consolidation under this section which
would result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combina-
tion or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of
banking in any part of the United States, or
(2) any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation under this
section whose effect in any part of the country may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner
would be in restraint or Isle) trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive
effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest
by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs
of the community to be served.
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the disparate offers made to the shareholders would not be in the
public interest."
On appeal," in reversing the decision of the Board, the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit HELD: the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System lacks statutory authority, express or
implied, to deny applications for approval of formation of one-bank
holding companies or of acquisition of a bank by a bank holding
company solely on the basis of a finding that approval would not be
in the public interest because of disparate price offers made to
minority and majority shareholders for the purchase of their
shares." The court reasoned that neither the express language nor
the legislative history of the Act supported the Board's interpretation
of its powers thereunder and that, had it so intended, Congress
could have conferred such power upon the Board. The court noted
in this regard that the statute established specific standards to guide
Board action and did not authorize negative action based upon a
broad determination of the public interest. 16
In deciding that a federal agency may not expand its powers
beyond those expressly granted by its enabling act, the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Western Bancshares follows the substantial
weight of federal precedent which refuses to allow a federal agency
to expand its authority on the basis of powers not expressly or
13 Effective Sept. 1, 1971, the Federal Reserve Board promulgated certain guidelines for
approval of holding company acquisitions, which guidelines included the mandate that "if any
offer to acquire the shares is extended to shareholders of the bank, the offer is extended to all
stockholders on an equal basis." 480 F.2d at 751 (emphasis omitted). These guidelines are
found in Rules Regarding Delegation of Authority, 12 C.F.R. 265.2(l)(22) (1973). These
rules delegate power to Federal Reserve Banks to approve the acquisition of a single bank by
a holding company.
14 Review of Board decisions under the Bank Holding Company Act is not a federal
district court function. Review is undertaken in the appropriate United States court of
appeals, but the findings of fact made by the Board, if supported by substantial evidence, are
final. 12 U.S.C. 1848 (1970).
In Whitney Nat'l Bank, 379 U.S. 411, 419 (1965), the Supreme Court held that Congress
intended the statutory proceedings before the Board and the review by the courts of appeals to
be the exclusive procedures in such cases.
is The Tenth Circuit could have disposed of the case on the grounds that the acquisition
of Rooks County State Bank occurred before the effective date of the 1970 Amendments to the
Bank Holding Company Act. The court stated that Western Bancshares was probably a de
facto corporation during December and, therefore, outside of the 1970 Amendments, which
were not in effect at that time. However, the court reasoned that such a finding was not
necessary to a disposition of the case. 480 F.2d at 752.
16 Id. at 753. Subsequent to the Tenth Circuit's decision, the Federal Reserve Board
announced that a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court had not been
filed, and that the Board had determined that it would acquiesce in the Western Bancshares
decision. Wash. Fin. Rep., Oct. 22, 1973, at A-9. This decision was made apparently as a
result of the Solicitor General's denial of the Board's request to seek Supreme Court review. In
compliance with the decision, the Board amended its Rules Regarding Delegation of Authority
(see note 13 supra) to eliminate the equivalent offer criterion from the Reserve Banks'
consideration of an application. Id. at T-16 to T-17.
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impliedly granted by its enabling statute." The decision is
significant in that it deprives minority shareholders of banking in-
stitutions of the right granted under the Board's guidelines to obtain
a price for their shares equal to that received by majority share-
holders in the absence of fraudulent conduct on the part of the
controlling shareholders.
This note will assess the court's decision in Western Bancshares
and pursue the practical implications of that decision. The sound-
ness of the Tenth Circuit's statutory interpretation will be evaluated
through an examination of the express language of the Act, the
legislative history of the Act, the prior case law pertaining to in-
terpretation of the Act, and the federal precedent dealing with the
issue of construction by an agency of its enabling statute. Thereaf-
ter, the court's decision will be analyzed to determine its effects
upon the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board, and upon the
rights of minority shareholders to substantially equivalent price of-
fers for their stock. A determination will be made that, as a result of
the Tenth Circuit's holding, the issue of minority shareholders'
rights to equivalent price offers must be resolved by the law of
corporations of the various states. This result will be criticized on
the basis of considerations of fairness and in light of the problem of
shielding corporations from mismanagement of corporate assets by
purchasers of controlling blocks of stock. It will be suggested that
legislation be enacted that would give the Federal Reserve Board
the power to better protect the rights of minority shareholders.
The Board in Western Bancshares contended that it was em-
powered under the Act and its 1970 Amendments to reject a holding
company's application to acquire the shares of a bank on the
grounds that the minority shares had been purchased for a lower
price per share than had the majority shares. The Board argued that
the words "public interest," found in section 3(c) of the Act," the
provision which specifies the factors the Board is to consider in
passing upon applications for approval of bank holding company
acquisitions, amounted to a "broad grant of legislative power au-
thorizing enforcement of its guideline requiring that all stock acquis-
ition offers must be substantially equal."" In response to these
contentions, the court of appeals stated that the Board's denial of
the application was beyond its statutory powers, and that the
Board's order was "based entirely on its administrative policy re-
quiring equal treatment to shareholders in bank acquisitions." 2 °
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the express statutory language
of the Bank Holding Company Act did not support the construction
17
 See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 71 (1973); United States v. Chicago, Mil., S
P. & Pac. R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 324 (1931).
Is 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1970).
39
 480 F.2d at 752.
20 Id.
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adopted by the Board. 2 ' The relevant factors to be considered by
the Board in determining whether to permit a holding company
acquisition were specified in section 3(c) of the Act:
(c) The Board shall not approve—
(2) any other proposed acquisition or merger or
consolidation under this section whose effect in any
section of the country may be substantially to lessen
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which
in any other manner would be in restraint or [sic]
trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of
the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the
public interest by the probable effect of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the commun-
ity to be served. 22
The Board contended that the phrase "public interest" in this section
was an implied grant of power to the Board to deny applications on
the basis of public policy factors not expressly set down in section
3(c), and in this case in particular, to require equal price offers for
minority shareholders' bank stock.
It would appear that the most reasonable construction of the
statute would require that the Board not consider the statute's
operative language, "public interest," until it had made a finding
that the proposed acquisition, merger, or consolidation would have
anti-competitive effects. After this finding was made, the Board
would then have discretionary power to approve the application in
the public interest, where it also found that the probable beneficial
effects of the transaction clearly outweighed the anti-competitive
effects. This interpretation of the statutory language would thus
foreclose a construction authorizing the Board to base its disposition
of an application solely upon an initial consideration of a broad
public interest factor. It could base approval on a consideration of
the public interest, subsequent to a finding that the transaction
would have anti-competitive effects. There was, therefore, no ex-
plicit statutory grant of a power to deny an application which the
Board found not to be in the public interest on the basis of its own
independently formulated standards for approval. It would seem
that had Congress intended to give the Board the authority it in fact
exercised, Congress could have done so.
In addition to rejecting the Board's construction of the statutory
language, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the legislative history of
the Act did not support the Board's assertion of authority. 23
 The
legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments
of 1970 indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize the
21 Id.
22 12 U.S.C.	 1842(c)(2) (1970).
23 480 F.2d at 752.
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Board to investigate undisclosed premium payments made by hold-
ing companies in acquiring the bank stock of majority
shareholders. 24
 In the court's opinion, the Amendments were in-
tended to protect against future abuses committed by previously
exempt one-bank holding companies in the form of the creation of
monopolies, reduction of competition and extension of credit lines to
finance unrelated business concerns as affiliates and subsidiaries. 25
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Congress did not authorize the
Board's regulation of price offerings for stock in banks by bank
holding companies. 26
It is submitted that the legislative history of the Bank Holding
Company Act27
 supports the court's position. In 1956, Congress
enacted the Bank Holding Company Act 28
 in order to regulate
holding company activities and to regulate bank acquisitions in
cases where the company controlled twenty-five percent or more of
the outstanding stock of two or more banks. 29 The Senate Banking
and Currency Committee sought to protect the public against the
dangers inherent in banking monopolies, and the Committee noted
two problems which gave rise to the need for regulation: (1) the
unrestricted ability of holding companies to acquire banking units
and to concentrate commercial bank facilities in a particular area
under a single controlling entity, and (2) the dangers posed to free
competition in the banking sector by the combination of banking
and nonbanking enterprises under the control of parent holding
companies. 30
 Significantly, the legislative history did not disclose
either consideration of, or an attempt by, Congress to regulate
undisclosed premium payments made by bank holding companies
seeking to acquire bank stock. 3 '
24
 The phrase "premium payments" will be hereinafter used to designate that portion of
the price per share paid by a purchaser to obtain a controlling interest in a corporation which
is over and above the price the purchaser would have paid per share if he had not obtained
control.
25
 480 F.2d at 752.
26 Id.
27 For a thorough discussion of the history and purpose of the Act and of the amend-
ments, see Legislation Note, The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, 39 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 1200 (1971). For an analysis of the similarities between the Bank Merger Act
and the Bank Holding Company Act, see Via, Antitrust and the Amended Bank Merger and
Bank Holding Company Acts: The Search for Standards, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1115 (1967). See also
Kintner & Hansen, A Review of the Law of Bank Mergers, 14 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 213
(1972).
29
 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 511, 70 Stat. 133, codified at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1956), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1970).
29 S. Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5520.
3° Id. See S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 2482.
In 1966, the Bank Holding Company Act was amended to require the Board, when
acting on applications for approval of acquisitions by bank holding companies, to consider the
same factors that were to be considered under the amended Bank Merger Act. S. Rep. No.
1179, 89th Cong. f
 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2393.
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The legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act'
Amendments of 1970 similarly indicated that Congress was not
concerned with unequal price offers for stock, but rather was, con-
cerned with other problems. By 1970, twenty-three of the fifty-one
banks in the United States with deposits of over one billion , dollars
were owned' by one-bank holding companies. 32 Six of the ,largest
banks in the country, which held over twenty per-cent of the
nation's deposits, were among the one-bank holding' companies
which had not been brought within the regulatory provisions of the
Bank Holding Company Act prior to that time. 33 For this reason,
Board regulation of one-bank holding companies was thought to be
necessary. The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, William McChesney Martin, warned the Senate
Banking and Currency Committee of the imminent risk of carteliz-
ing the economy, with business firms clustering about giant one-
bank holding companies. 34 It was feared that such clustering would
take place for the reason that nonbanking businesses would seek to
become subsidiaries of bank holding companies because of the lower
interest rates and favorable credit terms that would be extended to
these businesses by the bank which was controlled by the holding
company. The Committee agreed that the "long-standing policy of
separating banking from commerce," by prohibiting holding com-
pany ownership and control of both banking and nonbanking enter-
prises, should be continued. 35 Thus, in enacting the Bank Holding
Company Act Amendments of 1970, Congress intended to bring the
one-bank holding company under the regulatory provisions of the
Act and thereby to preserve competition in the field of banking. 36
Nothing in the legislative history indicated that Congress intended
to give the Board power to prevent disparate price offerings for
bank stock by bank holding companies. 37
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Western Bancshares that the
Board lacked power to regulate the price offered to stockholders for
the purchase of their shares of bank stock by bank holding com-
panies was further substantiated by the decisions of other courts
These are the current standards found in 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1970). The original standards in
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 included: the financial history, condition and
prospects of each bank; the character of the management; the convenience, needs and welfare
of the geographic area; and whether the effect of the acquisition would be to expand the size
of the bank holding company beyond limits consistent with adequate and sound banking, the
public interest, and the preservation of competition in the banking field. Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 511, 70 Stat, 133, codified at 12 U.S.C. * 1842(c) (1956).
32 S. Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5521.
Id.
34 Id. at 5521-22.
" Id. at 5522.
36 Id. See also Legislation Note, The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970,
39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1200 (1971).
37 480 F.2d at 752.
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which have interpreted section 3 of the Bank Holding Company
Act. The case law under the 1956 Act disclosed that both the Board
and the courts construed the Act as being designed to secure sound
bank management and to preserve competition in the banking field.
As the standards in the 1956 Act were substantially the same as the
1966 amended standards for Board consideration of applications for
approval of bank holding company acquisitions," a review of that
case law is relevant to an evaluation of the decision in Western
Bancshares.
By the time of the enactment of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956, the power of the federal government under the Con-
stitution to create and govern banking institutions was
well-established. 39 In Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Woodall,"
the Tenth Circuit, noting that a great part of this power had been
delegated to the Federal Reserve Board, held that section 11(i) of the
Federal Reserve Act, 4 ' authorizing the Board to make rules and
regulations necessary to enable it effectively to perform its statutory
duties under the Act, amounted to a general grant of power to make
rules and regulations which were consistent with the objective of the
Act and were designed to increase the effectiveness of the Board's
discharge of its duties. 42
Although the Board has been granted broad discretionary au-
thority with regard to other matters within its field of expertise, 43
38 See note 31 supra.
29 Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 375 (1954).
°° 239 F.2d 707 110th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 909 (1957).
41
 12 U.S.C. § 248(1) (1970).
42
 239 F.2d at 710. In Continental Bank, the issue arose as to whether the Board had
power to conduct a hearing to determine if the bank suffered from an inadequate capital
structure and should be required to surrender its stock in the Federal Reserve Bank. 12
U.S.C. NI 321-27 (1970) authorized the Board to require all banks to comply with the capital
requirements of the Act. These sections, however, did not expressly confer power upon the
Board to conduct a hearing into the adequacy of a member bank's capital structure. The court
held, however, that these sections, when read as a whole and in combination with 12 U.S.C.
§ 248(i) (1970), which authorized the Board to establish procedures necessary to perform its
duties, gave the Board the right to conduct such a hearing.
43 The Supreme Court has recently recognized the extensive discretionary authority
delegated by Congress to the Board in at least one area. In an action by a magazine subscriber
against a subscription service company to recover a civil penalty for failure to make disclos-
ures required by the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970), the Supreme Court in a
divided decision, Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), stated
that
where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the agency may ". . .
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this Act," we have held that the validity of a regulation promulgated thereunder will
be sustained so long as it is "reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling
legislation."
Id. at 369. In light of the legislative history of the Act, the Court found that the Board's four
installment rule, requiring creditors to comply with the disclosure requireMents of the Act if
the sum owed is payable in more than four installments regardless of the absence of a finance
charge, was reasonably related to the objective of preventing evasion of disclosure. The Court
reasoned that Congress had determined to give that Act a general form and to entrust the
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the powers of the Board under the Bank Holding Company Act to
approve bank acquisitions by bank holding companies have been
generally restricted by the courts and by the Act itself to a narrower
scope. 44
 Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, the courts
have generally confined the Board's power to deny applications for
approval of acquisitions by bank holding companies to situations
where the Board found denial necessary for the preservation of
competition and sound bank management policies. For example, in
Marine Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 45
 the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the evidence supported
the Board's finding that the proposed acquisition would be detri-
mental to the preservation of competition in banking and, hence,
that it would be contrary to the public interest. In light of this
finding, the court in Marine Corp. affirmed the Board's ruling which
denied the application for approval. The Seventh Circuit did not
find it necessary for the Board to consider additional factors in
making its determination whether to approve the proposed acquisi-
tion.
Prior to the promulgation of the equal offer requirement in its
1971 guidelines, the Board did not contend that it was empowered
under the aegis of section 3(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act to
prescribe duties owed to minority shareholders. In fact, it is argu-
able that the Board may have initially disavowed any interest in
expanding its jurisdiction into this area. In Kirsch v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System," the Sixth Circuit held
that the Board had properly refused to conduct a hearing to deter-
mine whether minority shareholders claiming a breach of fiduciary
duties by majority shareholders with respect to a proposed bank
acquisition were entitled to relief. The petitioners were owners of
minority shares in an existing holding company. They opposed the
acquisition by the parent company of a certain additional bank
subsidiary on the grounds that such an acquisition would be con-
trary to their financial interests as holders of voting trust certificates,
and would also be a poor management decision. Despite these
assertions, the Board granted approval of the application. In up-
holding the Board's decision, the Sixth Circuit indicated that the
Board had not abused its discretion by declining to determine
whether the majority stockholders had breached their fiduciary
duties to the minority group. The court determined that the Bank
interpretation to the Board as an agency with adequate experience and resources to administer
it. Id. at 365. For a discussion of the Mourning case, see Note, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev.
394 (1973).
44
 This is the case despite the language of 12 U.S.C. § 1844(6) (1970), which confers
general implementing rule-making power on the Board. The Board is given great discretion-
ary power in the administration of § 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843
(1970), which deals with permissible interests in nonbanking organizations.
' 9
 325 F.2d 960, 962, 968 (7th Cir, 1963).
46 353 F.2d 353, 356 (6th Cir. 1965).,
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Holding Company Act of 1956 did not require the Board to exercise
jurisdiction with respect to policy differences between a corporation
and its minority shareholders or minority holders of voting trust
certificates when acting on an application to acquire assets of
another bank. 47 In language foreshadowing the decision in Western
Bancshares, the court in Kirsch stated that if the holding company,
its officers, directors or voting trustees had failed to follow correct
procedures or had acted unlawfully with respect to the minority
owners of voting trust certificates, the issues should be resolved in
the appropriate state court."
It is submitted that the Board in 1965, by refusing to grant the
minority shareholder group a hearing, impliedly admitted that its
jurisdiction over bank holding company acquisitions did not extend
to a determination of whether the majority had breached a fiduciary
duty owed to the minority when the majority authorized the acquisi-
tion of the subsidiary. 49 The Board's contentions in Western
Bancshares represent an abrupt turnabout from its position in
Kirsch. Both cases involved questions of the rights of minority
shareholders which traditionally had been resolved through applica-
tion of state corporation law. Furthermore, the applicable statutory
language was essentially the same in both cases. The 1956 standards
for approval of acquisitions, still in effect at the time of the 1965
Kirsch decision, contained the phrase "public interest" in substan-
tially the same context as did the amended standards. 5° However, in
Kirsch, the Board did not contend, as it did in Western Bancshares,
that the phrase "public interest" constituted a grant of power to
deny applications for approval of acquisitions by bank holding com-
panies on the basis of a finding that the proposed acquisition would
involve inequitable treatment of minority shareholders and therefore
would not be in the public interest.
Although the Board declined to attempt an expansion of its
powers under the Bank Holding Company Act in order to protect
minority shareholders in Kirsch, it subsequently interpreted the
statute as granting it extensive powers to investigate such matters as
control premiums. The Board implemented its interpretation requir-
ing equal treatment of shareholders in other bank holding company
acquisitions, and in none of these pre-Western Bancshares decisions
was the Board's jurisdiction to do so challenged." The Board was,
47 Id. at 357-58.
4° Id.
44
 In the absence of written disapproval of an application by the Comptroller of the
Currency or the supervisor of the state banking authority, the Board is not required to grant a
hearing in determining whether to approve a bank acquisition by a bank holding company. 12
U.S.C. § 1842(b) (1970).
'° 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1956), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1970); see note 31 supra.
5 ' The Board applied the substantially equivalent offer requirement in many of its
decisions during 1972. See, e.g., Robles, Inc., 37 Fed. Reg. 23,294 (1972) (application
approved and compliance noted); Farmers Enterprise, Inc., 37 Fed. Reg. 23,383 (1972)
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in fact, commended for its efforts. The American Bankers Associa-
tion, for example, voiced its approval of the Board's requirement. 52
The Federal Reserve Board in Western Bancshares attempted to use
this prior successful administrative experience under its regulation to
support its arguments that it possessed jurisdiction to deny an appli-
cation on the basis of unequal premium payments made to majority
shareholders. Recognizing that courts, in applying the rules of
statutory construction, generally give greater weight to an adminis-
trative agency's interpretation of a statute if it is long-standing and
consistent, 53 the Board demonstrated that it had interpreted its
enabling act to require review of undisclosed premium payments to
majority shareholders, and that it had consistently applied the re-
quirement of equivalent offers in reviewing applications for bank
acquisitions. The court responded that this implementation in prac-
tice was not decisive because the Board could not exceed its statu-
tory authority, even if its policy for doing so was sound and its
implementation successful. 54
The Board might have found some support for its position in
other rules of statutory construction. Courts generally give deference
to an interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with the
initial implementation of the statute, and, although the courts are
not normally bound by such agency interpretations, it is established
that such "contemporaneous constructions" should not be overruled
without substantial reasons for doing so. 55 The Tenth Circuit, faced
with this assertion in Western Bancshares, determined that the
interpretation placed by the Board on the enabling statute could not
be controlling in light of the Act's limited grant of power to the
Board. Support could be found for this position in First National
Bank v. First Bank Stock Corp.," where, in the course of its
opinion, the court stated that the interpretation of the Bank Holding
Company Act by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, which administered the Act and which played an active
part in its enactment, was entitled to substantial weight, but that it
was not controlling. 57
The courts generally accord controlling weight to the agency
interpretation where a contemporaneous construction of a statute by
an agency charged with its administration finds support in the
statutory language and legislative history. 58 In contrast to such
(application denied on the basis of unequal treatment of shareholders and excessive acquisition
debt).
52 480 F.2d at 752.
53
 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
54 480 F.2d at 752.
55
 Hingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 749-50 (1969).
56 306 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1962).
57
 Id. at 941.
5 " Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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expressly or impliedly authorized agency constructions and regula-
tions, the rule 59 promulgated by the Board in Western Bancshares
amounted to an attempt to go beyond effectuation of the legislative
intent. The Board's regulation added a new requirement under the
Bank Holding Company Act for which no express or implied basis
could be found in the Act or in its legislative history. In light of this
fact, the Tenth Circuit was constrained to reject the Board's con-
struction of its enabling Act.
It is established that administrative regulations, to be valid,
must be within the confines of the powers granted to the agency by
the enabling statute. 6 ° In recent cases, the federal courts have not
hesitated to hold administrative agency rules invalid where the rules
conflict with the enabling statute and the agency, in promulgating
the rules, has exceeded its statutory authority. 61 A reviewing federal
court is statutorily authorized to determine whether an administra-
tive agency's action has exceeded its statutory bounds. The Adminis-
trative Procedure Act provides that "[tihe reviewing court shall ..
hold unlawful and set aside agency action ... found to be . . . in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right . . "6 2 On the basis of these requirements the Tenth
Circuit refused to uphold the equivalent offer policy promulgated by
the Board under the Bank Holding Company Act. 63
Within the framework of the express language of the Bank
Holding Company Act, its legislative history and the pertinent prior
case law, it is submitted that the decision in Western Bancshares is
correct. The Tenth Circuit properly found that the Board had been
given neither express nor implied statutory authority to regulate the
price which bank holding companies offered for the purchase of
stock in banks, unless the Board first found that the transaction
would have anti-competitive effects.
Beyond the issue of the soundness of the Tenth Circuit's statu-
tory interpretation of the Bank Holding Company Act in Western
Bancshares, there arise significant questions concerning the possible
59 The term "rule" is defined in the Administrative Procedure Act as follows:
(4)"[Rlule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or pre-
scribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice require-
ments of an agency . . . .
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
6' Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933).
61 See National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Shay v.
Agricultural Stabilization & Conservation State Comm., 299 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1962);
Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
62 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c) (1970). Agency action includes all or part of an agency rule. 5
U.S.C. § 551(13) (1970).
63 The decision in Western Bancshares, curtailing the asserted authority of a powerful
federal agency, is not without precedent. See, e.g., cases cited in note 61 supra. The Supreme
Court has determined that the powers exercised by federal agencies are limited to those
authorized by the agency's enabling legislation. See NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973);
United States v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 282 U.S. 311 (1931).
380
CASE NOTES
implications of the Western Bancshares decision. One such issue
involves the question of the effects the decision will have upon the
Federal Reserve Board in the context of the federal bank regulatory
structure." In order to analyze this issue properly, it is necessary to
outline briefly this structure. There are three federal bank supervis-
ory agencies: the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve
Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).The
overlapping authority of these agencies in the administration of laws
in some areas has "given rise to interpretative, regulatory, and
policy differences, particularly in recent years." 65
 There are also
indications that each of the agencies has attempted to increase its
powers under the various statutes it administers, thereby giving rise
to additional conflicts. 66
 Thus, within the federal bank regulatory
system there apparently exists a potential for competition between
agencies seeking to attain a dominant position.
The Federal Reserve Board has been given exclusive jurisdic-
tion to administer the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of
1970. 67
 Within the framework of the federal regulatory system of
banks, such a grant of exclusive jurisdiction is unusual. Congress
rejected proposals to divide administration of the Act among the
three federal bank supervisory agencies. 68
 Congress thus placed the
" Since only a very small proportion of the banks in the nation are noninsured non-
member banks, which are exclusively under state regulation, the federal bank supervisory
structure determines the basic nature of bank regulation. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking
System, 52 Va. L. Rev. 565, 566 (1966).
65
 See Hackley, supra note 64, for a thorough discussion of the results of the overlapping
powers of the three supervisory agencies.
60
 See Arnold Tours v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 438 (1972); Wash. Fin. Rep., May 29,
1972, at T-6 to T-8; Wash. Fin. Rep., July 24, 1972, at A-1. These problems have led to
several different proposals in the 1960's for the consolidation of bank regulatory power. See
Hackley, supra note 64, at 802-12.
67
 The Attorney General can institute an antitrust action during the first thirty days after
the approval of a bank holding company acquisition by the Board. 12 U.S.C. § 1849(b) (1970).
68
 Address by Jerome W. Shay, The Bank Regulation Institute, March 29, 1973, printed
in Wash. Fin. Rep., April 9, 1973, at T-8 thereinafter cited as Shay].
There is some evidence that the Board has not limited its attempts to expand its powers
beyond those granted to it under the Bank Holding Company Act exclusively to the matter of
stock acquisition prices. The Board has been active in applying its capital adequacy require-
ment, despite the fact that the matter of capital adequacy has traditionally been "regarded as
within the province of the particular bank's primary supervisor, Federal or State." Id. The
effect of such activity by the Board is not limited to an area in which the Board possesses
exclusive jurisdiction, as is the case in Western Bancshares, but constitutes an impingement
upon the jurisdictions of other bank regulatory agencies, both state and federal. For an
example of the application of the capital adequacy test by the Board, see Chicago City
Bancorporation, Inc., 38 Fed. Reg. 7363 (1973). The Board has also denied an application for
approval of an acquisition because of excessive management consulting fees. Valley Agency
Co., 37 Fed. Reg. 22,914 (1972), It is arguable that these actions may be within the Board's
power under 3(c) of the Act, requiring the Board to consider "the financial and managerial
resources and future prospects" of the banks and holding companies concerned. 12 U.S.C.
1842(c) (1970). However, if the Board has overstepped its statutory bounds in these areas,
Western Bancshares indicates that it will not he allowed to continue to do so.
In response to complaints by the Independent Bankers Association of America to the
effect that the capital adequacy guidelines, which restricted the amount which a bank holding
381
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Board in a potentially dominant position with respect to the other
two agencies in the area of federal banking regulation: The decision
of the Tenth Circuit, however, restricted the Board's powers under
the Act to those expressly granted by the legislation. In this respect,
it is submitted that the case could have the salutary effect of limiting
some of the jurisdictional conflict among federal bank supervisory
agencies by refusing to allow each agency to extend its powers
beyond those given to it by Congress. However, Western
Bancshares will probably not result in a change of the Board's status
within the regulatory structure. Because the decision curtails the
exercise of a power by the Board not exercised by the other
agencies—the regulation of price offers in bank stock
acquisitions—the Comptroller and the FDIC will not be able to
enter into the vacuum created by the Tenth Circuit's decision and
absorb the power to regulate such price offers. 69
It should be noted, however, that the Bank Holding Company
Act itself may have the potential for establishing the predominance
of the Board within the bank supervisory structure. It would not
appear that the Western Bancshares decision has measurably limited
this potential. There has been a rapid increase of both the size and
the number of bank holding companies in recent years. At the end of
1970, there were 121 regulated bank holding companies with sixteen
percent of the nation's deposits, whereas, at the beginning of 1973,
there were 1,600 regulated bank holding companies with over sixty
percent of all commercial bank deposits." This growth has occurred
because the Act appears to make holding company expansion more
company could borrow to finance a bank acquisition to fifty percent of the purchase price or
fifty percent of the equity capital of the holding company, might reduce the number of buyers
with cash to buy small banks, Wash. Fin. Rep., June 26, 1972, at A-9 to A-10, the Board
amended those requirements to permit borrowing up to seventy-five percent of these sums.
Wash. Fin. Rep., Nov. 6, 1972, at T-I. The Bankers Association apparently felt that the
Board had overreached its authority.
69
 A more serious threat to the Board's power is posed by the definite trend in recent
years of withdrawal of banks from Federal Reserve membership. This trend threatens to
weaken the position of the Board within the federal regulatory structure. Between 1956 and
1972, 756 member banks withdrew from the Federal Reserve System. Letter from D. L.
Rogers, Executive Director of the Association of Registered Bank Holding Companies, to the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Feb. 7, 1973, printed in Wash. Fin. Rep.,
Feb. 12, 1973, at T-3 to T-4.
The Board, however, has indicated that it may ask Congress for an amendment of its
enabling act, which would require that subsidiary banks of bank holding companies become
members of the Federal Reserve System, in order to limit this process of bank withdrawal and
to further consolidate its power. Hamilton Bancshares, 38 Fed. Reg. 1307 (1973). Such a
requirement would probably be enacted by Congress if needed by the Board in the adminis-
tration of the monetary system, and the requirement of membership would undoubtedly
establish the Board's preeminence in the bank supervisory system if superimposed upon the
widespread trend of adoption of the bank holding company form of organization. In contrast
to its position in Western Bancshares, the Board in Hamilton recognized the necessity of
seeking a grant of power from Congress in order to increase its authority through the Bank
Holding Company Act.
7° Shay, supra note 68, at T-8.
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advantageous than branching in many situations, 71
 and section 4(c),
permitting bank holding companies to engage in certain non-
banking activities which the Board finds to be "closely related to
banking,"72
 is likely to attract larger banks desiring to diversify their
activities by utilization of the holding company form.
The Western Bancshares decision raises the further question as
to what rights minority bank shareholders now have to obtain price
offers for their stock substantially equivalent to those offered to
majority shareholders. The Tenth Circuit decision indicates that the
Board will have to obtain an amendment to the Bank Holding
Company Act if it desires to impose the requirement of equivalent
offers. Unless and until the Board procures such legislation, minor-
ity shareholders will be left to seek means of enforcing such a right
in state corporation law, and, possibly in the securities laws. Al-
though stating that it had "no argument with the Board's policy
determination," 73
 the Tenth Circuit terminated the special federal
protection provided by the Board to minority shareholders in banks
acquired by holding companies. The Board argued for its policy
requirement on the grounds that (1) consideration of equity de-
manded it; (2) without it, minority shareholders would not be as
willing to invest in bank stock; and (3) the requirement protected the
minority from mismanagement. The Board had urged that minority
shareholders needed such protection because
(1) inherent fairness justifies a policy that all sharehol-
ders be treated on an equivalent basis;
(2) to the extent that minority shareholders were
treated less equitably than majority shareholders, capital
financing for bank stock would be hindered; and
(3) without an opportunity to sell out on a substan-
tively [sic] equivalent basis to majority stockholders, the
minority interest in a bank suffered a precarious
existence. 74
As will be explained below, the first and third contentions find
support in the legal commentaries on this subject. 75
The issue of whether minority shareholders have a right to
obtain price offers for the purchase of their shares equal to those
obtained by the majority and controlling stockholders, or, as an
alternative, have a right to share the profits derived from the sale of
71
 In First Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 465 F.2d 586, 596-97 (D.C,Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1124 (1972), the court held that the Comptroller cannot approve branching where the state
statute disallows it. The interpretation of the statute by the state authorities is not binding
upon the Comptroller. State banking law restrictions upon branch banking are not applicable
to bank holding companies.
72
 12 U.S.C. § 1843(cX8) (1970).
73 480 F.2d at 752.
74 Id. at 752-53.
75 See text at notes 97-101 infra.
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the control block, has generated a great deal of litigation and discus-
sion. The commentators have generally agreed that minority
shareholders should be accorded these rights. 76 The case law in the
majority of jurisdictions denies the existence of such rights.
It is important to note, for example, that the minority sharehol-
ders in Western Bancshares would not have a remedy under the law
of Kansas, the state of the bank's incorporation. In McDaniel v.
Painter," the Tenth Circuit applied Kansas law and rendered a
decision representative of the majority view regarding nonequival-
ent stock purchases. Minority shareholders in a Kansas bank filed
suit against majority shareholders for alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties in the sale of the bank stock insofar as the majority failed to
inform minority stockholders of the offer to purchase, and insofar as
they sold the stock as insiders at a price not available to the minor-
ity. The court held that a dominant or majority stockholder did not
become a fiduciary for other shareholders by reason of mere owner-
ship of stock, and that dominant shareholders were entitled to re-
ceive a premium for their stock which reflected the control potential
of the stock. 78
The case law in a majority of jurisdictions was summarized by
the Sixth Circuit in Seagrave Corp. v. Mount. 79 The court stated
that there are recognized exceptions to the general rule that control-
ling and majority stockholders may dispose of their shares at any
time and for any price they desire without incurring liability to other
stockholders. Liability arises
where fraud is involved in the actions of the dominant
directors and stockholders, where controlling stockholders
turn over their shares to purchasers who mismanage the
corporation or loot the corporate assets, where non-
controlling stockholders are induced to sell their shares by
concealment of the fact that a premium is being paid to the
controlling stockholders, where controlling stockholders or
directors make a secret profit from a transaction, or where
directors are dealing directly with the corporation to their
own personal advantage, known or unknown."
Thus, minority shareholders' rights to profits resulting from pre-
76 Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78
Harv. L. Rev. 505 (1965); Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium; The Definition, 53 Minn. L.
Rev. 485 (1969); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 Cornell L.Q. 628
(1965); Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1956). But see Javaras,
Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Controlling Shares: A Reply to Professor Andrews, 32 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 420 (1965).
77 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969). Since the Rooks County State Bank is located in
Kansas, this case would be relevant precedent in an action by the minority shareholders
seeking to recover their share of an undisclosed premium payment.
75 Id. at 547.
76 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954).
s° Id. at 395.
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mium payments depend upon a showing of some affirmative
fraudulent conduct on the part of the majority or controlling stock-
holders. Mere nondisclosure of premium payments, as in Western
Bancshares, would not entitle minority shareholders to share the
profits. In the ordinary sale situation, therefore, the law of most
jurisdictions offers little assistance to the minority shareholder.
There is a minority position to the contrary." The leading case
recognizing a right in minority shareholders to obtain prices equival-
ent to those obtained by the majority for the sale of their stock is
Perlman v. Feldmann. S 2
 The principal defendant, when he was
dominant stockholder, chairman of the board of directors and presi-
dent of the steel company in which the plaintiffs were minority
shareholders, sold his stock at a premium. The plaintiffs contended
that the sale of the controlling stock amounted to the transfer of a
corporate asset in the form of the power to allocate the corporate
product at the time it was in short supply as a result of war demand.
The court reasoned that the transaction involved a sale of goodwill
and the sale of the corporation's opportunity to recieve interest-free
loans from customers for plant modernization, and held that both
directors and dominant stockholders stand in a fiduciary relationship
to the corporation and to the minority stockholders. It must be
noted, however, that the court limited its holding, stating that it did
not suggest that a majority stockholder would never be free to sell
his stock without incurring liability for profits." Thus, even the
Perlman decision may be of limited value for minority
shareholders."
st An apt statement of the minority rule and of its rationale is found in Jones v. H.F.
Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969).
The traditional judicial position was that a controlling shareholder was not a fiduciary
and owed no duty to minority shareholders when he sold his stock to outsiders. See, e.g.,
Keely v. Black, 91 N.J. Eq. 520, 111  A. 22 (1920). Among the earliest cases to adopt a rule
entitling minority shareholders to recover a pro rata distribution of the profits resulting from a
premium payment was Dunnett v. Arne, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934). In that case, the
majority stockholders-directors actively induced the minority shareholders to accept a lower
price for their stock by concealing the price received for the majority stock. The court
reasoned that the sale involved amounted to a corporate transaction and, therefore, imposed
liability on the defendant majority shareholders for the breach of fiduciary duties owed to the
majority group. Id. at 920. The limitations of this decision became apparent shortly thereafter
when the Tenth Circuit held in the companion case of Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68 (10th Cir.
1937), that, as long as he does not dominate, interfere with or mislead other stockholders, the
majority shareholder is free to dispose of his stock. Id. at 69.
02 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
g 3 219 F.2d at 178. In a recent California case, Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252,
76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969), the court held that the duty of a majority stockholder-director, when
contemplating the sale of majority stock at a price not available to other stockholders, is to act
affirmatively and openly with full disclosure so that every opportunity is given the minority to
obtain equivalent terms. Id. at 272, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94.
gg The Perlman decision might be interpreted to be limited to its particular facts. The
court in limiting its holding stated:
[Wlhen the sale necessarily results in a sacrifice of this element of corporate good will
and consequent unusual profit to the fiduciary who had caused the sacrifice he
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As in the majority of jurisdictions under state corporation law,
minority shareholders appear to have no right to recover under
federal securities law for the sale of a controlling block of stock at a
premium. 85
 Claims have been based on alleged violations of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 86 and its implementing regula-
tion,, SEC Rule 10b-5. 87 These general anti-fraud provisions apply
to the sale in interstate commerce of any security, including bank
securities not required to be registered under the Securities Ex-
change Act. Unlike the registration provisions of the Securities Ex-
change Act, which are administered by the three bank regulatory
agencies with respect to bank securities, section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 are administered and enforced by the Securities Exchange
Commission. 88 These anti-fraud provisions are intended to cover
"misleading or deceptive activities, whether or not they are precisely
and technically sufficient to sustain a common law action for fraud
and deceit."89
 It has been judicially established that an implied
private right of action exists under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 90
Nevertheless, minority shareholders have not succeeded in recover-
ing for damages allegedly incurred where majority stockholders
should account for his gains. So in a time of market shortage, where a call on a
corporation's product commands an unusually large premium, in one form or
another, we think it sound law that a fiduciary may not appropriate to himself the
value of this premium.
219 F.2d at 178,
55 Recent federal cases have suggested another possible approach to the situation where
the dominant shareholders receiving the premium payment hold no position of management
and, therefore, have none of the fiduciary responsibilities of corporate officers. These are the
cases containing claims based on § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1970), and on SEC Rule 10b(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). In Ferraioli v. Cantor,
281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court stated that the question of whether a controlling
stockholder may invite some shareholders but not others to participate in the sale of control-
ling stock at a premium is analagous to the issue of whether trading by an insider on the basis
of material undisclosed information may violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b(5). Id. at 357-58. But
the court in Ferraioli did not find it necessary to reach the question of whether a controlling
stockholder would violate § 10(b) and Rule 10b(5) when he sold his control stock at a premium
without notifying any other stockholders. Id. at 357. However, in Christophides v. Porco, 289
F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the same court held that the majority or dominant shareholder
is entitled to receive a premium representing the control potential, and the court sharply
criticized the Rule 10b(5) approach as "esoteric and implausible." Id. at 406.
In Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1972), the appellant relied on'
Ferraioli. The court stated that "Mlle opinion in that case cited no authority for this
proposition ," and went on to say that "iplerhaps under some circumstances, the purchase
of shares by one individual from another who has withheld from the seller information that
the buyer has been offered a greater price for the same shares might be a deceptive practice
within the meaning of Section 10(b)." Id. at 1312-13. The court subscribed to the general rule
of Christophides: there is no obligation to "share and share alike." Id. at 1313.
56
 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
57 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
68 The banking agencies have authority to administer certain provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act: 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, in, n(a), n(c), n(d), n(f) and p(1). 15 U.S.C. § 781(i) (1970).
55
 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970). 	 •
J.I. Case Co. v. Barak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Erling v. Powell, 429 F.2d 795, 797 (8th
Cir. 1970).
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failed to disclose that they were selling their controlling block of
corporate stock in return for a control premium.
The utility of the anti-fraud provisions for minority sharehol-
ders seeking to recover for a sale of controlling stock at a premium is
limited in several ways. As compared with the Federal Reserve
Board's equivalent offers requirement, the claimant asserting a Rule
10b-5 claim must have been either the purchaser or seller of the
securities, or he must be able to show damages flowing directly from
the unlawful act of the purchaser or seller. 9 ' Thus, the minority
shareholder would have to have sold his shares at the disadvanta-
geous price before he would have standing under Rule 10b-5, unless
the court would accept the argument that the sale of the controlling
stock at a premium caused damage to the minority stockholder by
depriving him of a profit rightly his. As has been noted previously,
courts are reluctant to accept this theory. There are indications,
however, that judicial interpretations of Rule 10b-5 are becoming
more liberal in allowing aggrieved individuals recourse under the
rule. It has' been suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 92 re-
laxed the requirement of fraud in connection with a securities trans-
action, so that only an indirect connection between the Rule 10b-5
fraud and the sale of securities is required. 93 Thus, the minority
shareholder would not have to sell to the majority shareholder, so
long as the controlling shareholder's failure to disclose the premium
payment received in the sale of his securities caused damage to the
minority shareholder. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 94
the Supreme Court held that failure to disclose material facts, i.e.,
those facts which an investor might have considered important in
making the decision to buy or sell, constituted a Rule 10b-5 fraud.
Assuming that minority shareholders should have the right to
an equal offer, as will be discussed below, Rule 10b-5 remains
inadequate, despite these two recent Supreme Court decisions, in
comparison with the Federal Reserve Board's equivalent offers re-
quirement, as a means of enforcing a minority shareholder's right to
an equal price for the sale of his stock. 95 At the present time, there is
very little likelihood that a minority shareholder will be able to
successfully assert a claim under Rule 10b-5 that the controlling
stockholder failed to disclose the fact that he had received an offer
for his controlling block of corporate shares which was higher than
that offered minority shareholders. Even if the federal courts were
Erling, 429 F.2d at 799.
9Z 404 U.S. 6 (1971). In Bankers Life, the Court found that the "in connection with"
requirement was satisfied since the corporation was injured "as a result of deceptive practices
touching its sale of securities as an investor." Id. at 12-13,
55 'See Note, 50 Texas L. key. 1273, 1286 (1972).
54 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972).
45 Cases subsequent to Bankers Life and Affiliated Ute indicate that the extent of
liberalization by the courts may not be as great as it would first have appeared to be. See
Haberman v. Murchison, 468 F.2d 1305 (1972), discussed in note 85 supra.
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to find that a majority shareholder had a duty to disclose such an
offer, the protection afforded minority bank shareholders under
Rule 1013-5 would still fall short of that provided by the Federal
Reserve Board prior to the decision in Western Bancshares. The
Second Circuit has recently held that a full and fair disclosure of all
material facts is all that is required by Rule 10b-5, even where the
underlying transaction may be unfair or involve a breach of
fiduciary duties. 96 According to this holding, if a controlling
shareholder disclosed to the minority shareholders that he was about
to receive a premium for the sale of his stock, the minority would
not be able to obtain either damages or an injunction under Rule
10b-5. In order to have standing, they would probably first have to
sell their shares at a disadvantageous price. Thus, under Rule 10b-5
an aggrieved shareholder could receive relief, if at all, only after the
sale of the corporate stock had taken place. In contrast to this
position, the Board's requirement that equivalent offers must be
made to all stockholders would afford minority shareholders greater
protection because it would operate before the sale of the corporate
stock could be completed, as compliance with the requirement
would be a prerequisite to approval of the acquisition of a bank by a
holding company. Furthermore, such relief could be granted by the
Board regardless of whether disclosure had been made of the higher
offer.
The question as to whether new protections should be afforded
minority shareholders or whether existing protections are adequate
requires an initial determination that minority shareholders should
have such rights. The issue of whether minority shareholders should
have the right to obtain price offers for their shares equal to those
obtained by majority and controlling shareholders has evoked con-
siderable discussion among legal commentators. 97 The adoption of a
rule that all shareholders have a right to an equal opportunity to
participate in a sale of stock pursuant to an offer to purchase the
control block at a premium has been urged with persuasive force by
Professor William D. Andrews." Professor Andrews argued that the
procedure for implementing a rule whereby minority shareholders
would be given an equal opportunity to participate in the sale of
corporate stock was already established with respect to tender offers;
the purchaser would make a tender offer, specifying the price and
the number of shares, and inviting all shareholders to tender their
stock if they wish to sell at that price. 99 If more than the desired
percentage of outstanding shares are tendered, the purchaser would
buy pro rata from each tendering shareholder.'°°
The arguments for and against Andrew's rule of equal oppor-
96 Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1972).
97 See note 76 supra.
98
 Andrews, supra note 76.
99
 Id. at 516.
I" Id.
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tunity center around questions of equity, prevention of mismanage-
ment and effects upon investment activities. The most compelling
reason for adopting the rule of equal opportunity would be that it
would produce the same result as a merger or a sale of corporate
assets—equality of participation in the proceeds. 101 It may be con-
tended, however, that implementation of the rule might have in-
equitable effects upon controlling shareholders in that it would
reduce the value of a controlling block of corporate stock, because
the shares could not be resold as a block unless either the purchaser
desired to buy one hundred percent of the outstanding shares or the
other shareholders failed to tender a number of shares sufficient to
fulfill the terms of the offer. It is submitted, however, that the
possible detrimental effects upon majority shareholders may not be
extensive and in any case should not be controlling. It has been
suggested that the controlling shareholder receives an adequate re-
turn for the premium which he has previously paid to obtain control
through the extra protection afforded his investment by virtue of the
control he may exercise during the length of his investment. 102
Furthermore, the rule would prevent minority shareholders from
being deprived of an equal right to participate in the profits derived
from each share of corporate stock, a right which obtains because of
the equal participation in the risk of the venture represented by each
outstanding corporate share. 103
A second factor argues for the adoption of a rule which would
provide minority shareholders with a right to obtain substantially
equivalent price offers for their stock. Mismanagement by purchas-
ers of control blocks would probably be discouraged by the rule of
equal opportunity. 104 Present state corporation law which renders
directors or majority shareholders liable for negligence in the sale of
their controlling shares affords their minority shareholders some
protection in this respect.'°5 Under the equal opportunity rule,
controlling shareholders would be unwilling to sell to purchasers
suspected of planning to loot or mismanage the corporation, for the
controlling shareholder would retain an interest in the corporation,
unless the purchaser bought all the shares outstanding.'" The
purchaser would have no incentive to loot the corporation if he had
purchased one hundred percent of its stock, for he would then be
looting his own assets.'° 7 Mismanagement is a recurrent problem,
and it would be especially desirable to prevent it in the banking area
where the public would either pay directly, through loss of deposits,
'°' Id. at 520, 535,
1 ° 2 Id. at 526.
1 ° 3 Id. at 521-22.
1 °4
 Id. at 517.
1 ° 3
 See, e.g., Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 {Sup. Ct. 1941); javaras, supra note
76, at 423.
106
 Andrews, supra note 76, at 517.
I" Id.
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or indirectly, through the payment by the federal government of
deposit insurance to aggrieved depositors for the consequences of
such mismanagement.
The rule of equal opportunity would, as the Board argued in
Western Bancshares with respect to the similar requirement of equi-
valent offers, serve the interests of equity and the sheltering of
minority shareholders from corporate mismanagement. Further-
more, the rule would not prevent' a purchaser from offering more
per share to acquire a controlling interest than where he does not
acquire such an interest, for, like the Board requirement that equal
offers be made to all shareholders, the rule of equal opportunity
would require only that all shareholders be extended the offer to sell
at a premium.'" However, purchasers, in order to reduce their
costs of purchasing a controlling interest, could buy first from minor-
ity shareholders at a lower price per share, as long as there was a
concurrent disclosure that they planned to pay more for majority
shares. 109
Either the Federal Reserve Board's equivalent offer rule or
Professor Andrew's equal opportunity doctrine might have undesir-
able effects upon investment activity. The equivalent offer or equal
opportunity rules would "impose higher capital requirements on
beneficial purchasers in a substantial number of transactions" by
forcing them to buy more shares than they would have otherwise
desired.'" Sellers of control blocks would often want to sell all of
their stock, either to obtain needed cash or to avoid possible policy
clashes and the risks attendant upon loss of control.'" The
purchaser's investment would be more expensive under the rule of
equal opportunity, as a consequence of the costs of dealing with
additional shareholders." 2 It is submitted that implementation of
the rule, which would be similar to the policy applied by the Board
in Western Bancshares, might discourage investment in two other
ways. The rule would have the effect of reducing the resale value of
a control block of stock in most circumstances. Institutional inves-
tors, often the owners of control blocks, take little interest in the
management powers stemming from control, and they purchase
shares primarily for investment profits. They would be discouraged
by having to pay higher prices to minority shareholders when pur-
chasing a control block under the rule. In theory, the rule could
result in deterring investment by potential controlling stockholders.
Despite the possible adverse consequences of the doctrine of
equal opportunity, it is submitted that the arguments in favor of
empowering the Federal Reserve Board to implement a regulation
In Id. at 527.
1 °9 Id. at 558.
II° Javaras, supra note 76, at 426.
in Id. at 425-26.
112
 Andrews, supra note 76, at 526.
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similar to the equal opportunity doctrine, when passing upon appli-
cations for acquisitions of banks by holding companies, should be
determinative. Considerations of equity support the adoption of
such a rule: minority shareholders should have a right to share
proportionately in the profits resulting from an increase in the in-
vestment value of their company's stock. A requirement of equival-
ent offers would tend to prevent majority shareholders from selling
to purchasers who might mismanage the bank, and thereby injure a
large number of depositors. In addition, in response to the position
that adoption of such a rule would deter large investors from invest-
ing in bank stocks, it should be noted that the Federal Reserve
Board's equivalent offer rule was in effect for nearly two years, and
during that period investment in bank holding companies greatly
increased. 113
 Furthermore, imposition of the requirement that equi-
valent price offers be made for the purchase of both minority and
majority bank shareholders' stock would very likely be an additional
incentive to the small investor to purchase shares in banking
institutions.' 14
 This result would be particularly desirable during the
present period of high interest rates.
As previously stated, however, present law does not provide
minority shareholders with adequate recourse to the courts in cases
of undisclosed premium payments. In the great majority of states,
the corporation law does not recognize any right of the minority
shareholder to share in the premium received from a sale of a
control block of stock. At this time, the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws provide little protection to minority sharehol-
ders in this situation. Furthermore, in many instances holding com-
panies could acquire the stock of in-state banks without using the
mails, interstate commerce or the facilities of a national securities
exchange, and thereby remain outside the jurisdiction of section
10(b) and Rule lob-S.
Thus, it would appear that given the existing state of the law,
the interests of minority shareholders in participating in the profits
to be derived from the sale of a controlling majority of corporate
stock could be best furthered by a requirement similar to the Federal
Reserve Board's provision struck 'down in Western Bancshares.
While it might be argued that the right of minority shareholders in
this regard should be governed by state corporation law, it is sub-
mitted that there exists a substantial federal interest in the supervi-
sion of the nation's financial institutions. Extensive control over a
113
 See text at note 70 supra. Furthermore, minority shareholder's rights under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d) (1970) to equal participation in the aoceeds resulting from mergers or sales of
corporate assets and liquidation do not appear to have deterred large investors.
114
 The Federal Reserve Board recognized this incentive effect when it argued that the
refusal of the Tenth Circuit to uphold its regulation in Western Bancshares would have the
consequence of inhibiting capital contributions in the banking industry on the part of small
investors. 480 F.2d at 752.
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substantial portion of the country's banking sector has existed since
the mid-nineteenth century. ' 15 It would appear that federal supervi-
sion of premium payments made to majority shareholders would not
be outside the ambit of this established federal interest. Further-
more, minority shareholders were given a federal right to equal
participation in the proceeds deriving from tender offers under the
Williams Bill, enacted in amendments to the Securities Exchange
Act. ' " 6
 Under those amendments a purchaser who has made a
tender offer 117
 for shares required to be registered under the Se-
curities Exchange Act"" must take up the shares pro rata during the
first ten days, and must supply certain information to the appro-
priate regulatory agency. Thus, since the minority shareholders are
informed of the impending tender offer, and since the buyer must
purchase the shares offered to him during the ten-day period,
whether by majority or minority shareholders, the minority
shareholders are afforded the opportunity to participate in the
profits to be derived from the tender offer.
In the case of registered bank stock, the provisions of the tender
offer legislation are administered by the bank regulatory agency
which has similar authority over its class of banks under sections 12,
14.and 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, with the exception of the
general anti-fraud provision, which is enforced by the Securities
Exchange Commission. 19 For the benefit of the selling security-
holders, such information as the identity of the offeror, the terms of
the offer, the offeror's source of financing (in the case of a cash
tender offer), complete financial data on both the offeror and the
target company (the company whose shares are solicited), and the
offeror's purposes and plans for the target company must be pro-
vided to the appropriate agency in advance of the offer. 12 ° Acquisi-
tions resulting in the beneficial ownership of more than five percent
of any class of securities are within the coverage of the statute, with
the exception of acquisitions during a twelve-month period which
would not exceed two percent of the class. 121
 The seller may with-
draw his securities during the first seven days of the offer. 122
 Con-
gress enacted the Williams Bill despite recognition that: (1) it might
deter tender offers by those reluctant to disclose the required infor-
"I See Hackley, Ouf Baffling Banking System, 52 Va. L. Rev. 570-73 (1966).
116 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-n
(1964). This right is granted specifically under 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970).
1 " Originally the tender offer legislation applied where the transaction resulted in ten
percent ownership, but the statute was amended to cover transactions resulting in only five
percent beneficial ownership. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970), amending 15 U.S.C. 78n(d) (1968).
118 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), (g)(1) (1970) requires registration of securities listed on a national
exchange and of securities of companies with assets of over $1,000,000 and at least 500
shareholders.
"9 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), n(e) (1970). See Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers,
15 N.Y.L,F. 462, 475 (1969).
120 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
' 21 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(1), (8) (1970).
122 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970).
392
CASE NOTES
mation; (2) compliance with the regulatory process would involve
additional costs; and (3) forced disclosure of the specified informa-
tion might raise the price the offeror would have to pay to attract
shares. '23 The provisions of the federal tender offer legislation
would not, however, apply in factual situations such as that in
Western Bancshares. The reason for this is that the tender offer does
not by definition encompass a nonpublic offer to purchase securities
from a small number of large shareholders, 124 which presents the
typical situation in which controlling blocks of stock are sold for a
control premium. Thus protection for minority shareholders must be
provided by other federal legislation.
The implementation by the Federal Reserve Board of its policy
that stock purchase offers must be extended to all shareholders of
the same class on an equal basis amounted to a requirement that a
tender offer be made. The nonpublic sale of control remains the only
method of transferring control whereby the dominant shareholder is
able to profit disproportionately to the detriment of minority
shareholders. The Board should be allowed to impose the require-
ment that holding companies seeking to acquire control of banks
extend equal offers to all shareholders. As a result of the decision in
Western Bancshares, this can only be accomplished through legisla-
tion. It is submitted that the information required to be disclosed to
the appropriate agency for public inspection under the federal tender
offer legislation should also be required to be disclosed by holding
companies seeking to acquire control of banks for the protection of
the banks' shareholders. The disclosure of such information would
lead to informed decision-making, which is a major objective of
federal securities law. Furthermore, the provisions of the amend-
ments to the Securities Exchange Act requiring that shares be taken
up pro rata during the first ten days only and that the seller may
withdraw his shares during the first seven days should also be
included in the legislation, as they appear to be reasonable and
workable. Administration of such legislation should be exclusively
vested in the Board in the case of bank holding companies. Respon-
sibility should not be divided between the three banking agencies
and the Securities Exchange Commission. Such a division of author-
ity would create administrative waste and inefficiency, as the Board
is presently required to process applications for the acquisition of
banks by holding companies.
On the basis of the express , statutory language of the 1970
Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act and the rules of
statutory interpretation, the Tenth Circuit's decision in Western
Bancshares appears correct. As a consequence of that decision,
however, the Board will not be allowed to expand its authority
under the Bank Holding Company Act in order to enforce its equi-
123 Bromberg, supra note 119, at 468.
134 Id. at 480-81.
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valent offer policy. There is a demonstrated need for the imposition
of the Board's requirement, and sufficient evidence to indicate that
it is unlikely to have detrimental effects. Under the Bank Holding
Company Act, the Board is required to make an annual report to
Congress on the administration of the Act.' 25 The Board is also
authorized to make "any recommendations as to changes in the law
which in the opinion of the Board would be desirable." 126 It is
submitted that the Board should propose and Congress should enact
an amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act granting the
Board authority to deny applications for approval of bank acquisi-
tions by bank holding companies unless substantially equivalent
price offers are made to all shareholders.
THOMAS J. FLAHERTY
Truth in Lending—Validity of Four Installment Rule of Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation Z--Mourning v. Family Publications
Service, Inc.'—Petitioner Leila Mourning contracted with Family
Publications Service (FPS) for a five-year subscription to four
magazines. The petitioner paid $3.95 at the outset and was to make
monthly payments of $3.95 for thirty months. Thus, all payments
for the sixty-month subscriptions were to have been completed dur-
ing the first half of the contract term.
The contract contained an acceleration clause whereby on the
default of the buyer, the entire balance would become immediately
due. Mourning made no further payments after her initial payment,
and FPS declared due the balance of $118.50. The contract given
Mourning contained no recital of the total purchase price of the
subscriptions, the amount due after the initial payment, or the
amounts and rates of any service or finance charges. Therefore,
alleging that FPS had failed to make the credit disclosures required
by the Truth in Lending Act, 2 petitioner brought suit in federal
district court3
 for recovery of the statutory penalty for
nondisclosure. 4
The central question in the litigation became the validity of the
so-called "four installment" rule of the Federal Reserve Board's
Regulation Z, 5 promulgated pursuant to authority granted in section
125
 12 U.S.C. § 1844(d) (1970).
126 Id .
' 411 U.S. 356 (1973). The statement of facts contained herein is taken from 411 U.S. at
358-61.
2
 15 U.S.C. H 1601-65 (1970). The Truth in Lending Act comprises Title I of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t (1970).
3
 Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 4 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 99,632,
at 89,607 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 1970).
See Truth in Lending Act § 130(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970).
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1973).
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